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OWNERSHIP OF SPACE
By Thompson George Marsh*
T would be giving away the whole story to state at the outset that this discussion is to be about nothing, or nothingness, and so the more scientific term, "space" has been
adopted. The mere fact that space may not have any value
does not negative the possibility of ownership thereof, because
the law is well settled that there may be ownership of almost
any sort of a new idea, and ownership of shares in almost any
sort of a corporation, new or old.
Almost any tangible object can be owned if it can be possessed or occupied, and the same is true of three dimensional
space defined by reference to the earth.
Ordinarily land is not considered as having three dimensions, but it must necessarily be so, and if the old maxim,
"cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et at inferos", be
true, the normal shape of land must be that of an inverted
pyramid, with its apex at the center of the earth, its sides determined by planes passing through the surface boundaries,
and its base "ad coelum". By a doctrine of accession any
tangible objects which are affixed within this space are considered to. be a part of the land. But when tangible things
are detached or removed from the space they are no longer
land but chattels, as rock that has been quarried, and they remain chattels until again affixed within some space, as rock
in a foundation.
This at least establishes that the objects themselves are
not land, and the other side of the proposition, namely, that
mere space is land, is just as true.
It is said that the largest building in the world is the
Merchandise Mart in Chicago; not the tallest, but the largest in cubic feet. The building is not owned by the owner of
*Professor of Law, University of Denver.
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the soil beneath it, nor was the right to possession acquired by
a lease. The soil was owned in fee simple by the Chicago
and Northwestern Railway Company and that part of the
space to be occupied by the building was conveyed in fee simple to the owners of the building. The rest of the land, including the surface and some space above it, was reserved by
the Railroad. The building is supported by piers and I am
not informed as to the ownership of the land upon which
those piers rest.
This is certainly an extreme illustration of the proposition that mere space is land and as much may be owned,
whether it be above or below the surface of the ground. And
it is believed that the incidents of ownership of space or land
are very much the same whether the land be above or below
the surface of the, ground.
Chief among the incidents of ownership of ordinary land
space are four claims: that the support of the soil, in its natural state, be not removed by another so as to cause substantial damage; that the land be not occupied or possessed by
another; that a reasonable use of the land be not interfered
with unreasonably by another; and that the close be not broken by another.
As to the validity of these claims as incidents of the ownership of space above the surface, the maxim quoted above is
not a sufficient basis upon which to base any conclusions.
At a meeting of the Air Law Institute in the summer of
1930, Dr. Arnold D. McNair, Lecturer in Law at the University of Cambridge, referred to the ancient maxim, not as
a maxim, but as a "slogan", and that seems a proper evaluation. It is found in the Year Books, but it would not have
gained much of a place in the common law, had it not been
used by Coke in his Commentary upon Littleton. The context in which it is there found may perhaps account for its
remarkable virility. In his discussion of fees simple the author says of land, "aald therefore this element of the earth is
preferred before the other elements; first and principally,
because it is for the habitation and resting place of man; for
man can not rest in any of the other elements, neither in the
water, ayre, or fire. For as the heavens are the habitation of
Almightie God, so the earth hath he appointed as the suburbs
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of heaven to be the habitation of man; * * Besides, everything, as it serveth more immediately * * for the food and
use of man* * * * hath the precedent dignity before any other.
And this doth the earth; for out of the earth commeth man's
food, and bread that strengthens man's heart, and the wine
that gladdeth the heart of man, and oyle that makes him a
cheerful countenance * * * Also the waters that yeeld fish for
the food and sustenance of man are not by that name demandable in a praecipe; but the land whereupon the water floweth
or standeth is demandable: and besides, the earth doth furnish man with many other necessaries for his use, as it is replenished with hidden treasures; namely, with gold, silver,
brasse, iron, tynne, lead, and other metals, and also with a great
varietie of precious stones, and many other things for profit,
ornament and pleasure. And lastly, the earth hath in law a
great extent upwards, not only of water, as hath been said,
but of ayre and all other things even up to heaven; for cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum".
In spite of its antiquity, that is not a very impressive statement of a rule of law, though it did set the slogan off to a
good start and it has been quoted ever since.
Getting back to a consideration of the claims incident to
ownership of land and a consideration of their meaning when
the land is space above the surface, we can at once recognize
the irrelevance of a claim that the support of the land in its
natural state be not removed by another, and pass to a consideration of the second claim, that the space be not occupied
or possessed by another. In positive terms this means that
the owner of the ground has the exclusive rightful power to
occupy the space above the ground. Of this there is no doubt,
for there are many cases ordering or justifying the removal of
overhanging eaves and signs and lights and branches. In
Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N. Y. 486; an action
of ejectment was maintained against a defendant who had
stretched a wire high above the surface of the plaintiff's land,
and in the case of the Merchandise Mart already mentioned,
since the grantees have acquired by conveyance the exclusive
rightful power to occupy the space above the surface, that
power must have been an incident of the ownership of the
land even before the space above the surface was actually oc-
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cupied. In this respect there seems to be no difference between the claims of the owner with reference to ground space
and air space.
The third incident of land ownership to be considered
is the claim that a reasonable use of the land be not interfered
with unreasonably by another. These are the cases of nuisances, by noises, odors, destructive fumes, vibrations, smoke,
dust, fear and other means of interference with enjoyment of
land, not involving a technical breaking of the close. In order to be actionable such interference must not only result in
substantial damage to the landowner, but it must be the result
of a negative or positive act of the defendant which under all
the circumstances is unreasonable. This is true whether the
means of interference be transmitted through the air or
through the ground. And since the damage to the landowner
is determined by reference to use, rather than to space, it seems
that in this respect the claim of the landowner is not affected
by the fact that the space involved may be above or below the
surface of the ground.
It is the fourth claim, that the close be not broken by
another, which raises the most interesting questions. It is
undoubtedly the general rule that any violation of this claim
makes the wrongdoer liable in trespass, whether he has acted
in good faith or bad faith, and whether damage has been
caused or not.
But while this is the general rule there are some interesting exceptions, some of the best examples of which are furnished by the decisions from our own state.
In Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, it is said that one who
breaks the close for the purpose of diverting and appropriating water is not liable for so doing.
And in Morris v. Fraker, S Colo. 425, it was held that if
cattle enter upon the land of the plaintiff and destroy crops,
the owner of the cattle is not liable unless the land was protected by a fence sufficient to turn ordinary stock.
In these cases the judges expressly stated that the results
were not based upon any statute, but simply upon what they
called necessity. The necessity lay merely in the fact that if
such invasions of the close were held actionable it was believed
that the development of agriculture and grazing would be
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seriously hampered, and the importance of those industries
was held to justify the departures from the general rule of
the common law, evert though in both cases there was not
merely a technical breaking of the close but resulting damage
of considerable consequence.
What about a breaking of the close above the surface of
the ground? Lord Ellenborough, in 1815, raised this quaere
in Pickering v. Rudd, a case in which it was decided that the
defendant's sign board did not hang over the plaintiff's land.
Such a case as a matter of course involved a discussion of the
maxim about heaven, and in the course of his opinion, Lord
Ellenborough said something about a balloon. As reported
in 4 Campbell 219, he said, "Nay, if this board overhanging
the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow that an
aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit,
at the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon
passes in the course of his voyage."
But as reported in 1 Starkie 45, he simply asked, "would
trespass lie for passing through the air in a balloon over the
land of another?"
In my opinion that question has not yet been answered,
though it was presented for decision in two cases which have
been reported during the past few months. Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co., 170 N. E. 385; and Swetland v. Curtiss
Airports, 41 Fed. 2nd. 929. In both cases the complainants
owned country estates adjoining airports and in both cases bills
were brought to enjoin flights by planes over the land of the
complainants, or perhaps more accurately, into the land of the
complainants. Both decisions relied to a considerable degree
upon the United States Air Commerce Act of 1926 wherein
penalties are provided for flights under minimum altitudes
of safety. The act empowered the Secretary of Commerce
to determine the minimum altitudes of safety. His regulation, contained in the Air Commerce Regulations of 1928, is
as follows: "exclusive of taking off from or landing on an established landing field, airport, or on property designated for
that purpose by the owner, * * * aircraft shall not be flown
(1) over the conjested parts of cities, towns, or settlements
except at a height sufficient to permit of a reasonably safe
emergency landing, which in no case shall be less than 1,000

DICTA

feet. (2) Elsewhere at heights less than 500 feet, except
where indispensible to an industrial flying operation."
In both cases the lands involved were in uncongested
areas, and in both it was held therefore that flights at an
altitude of over 500 feet were not actionable. Presumably
then, the "coelum" begins at 500 feet and according to Lord
Coke's explanation of the maxim, the Secretary of Commerce
has the power, within the limits of a sound discretion to enlarge or even to diminish the area of the "habitation of Almightie God" at will, with the corresponding loss or gain to
all the owners of parts of the "habitation of man" in the
United States.
And the Secretary of Commerce has done just that, by an
amendment to the Federal Air Traffic Rules, effective September 19, 1930, subsequent to the decisions in these cases.
The amendment says that, "The minimum safe altitudes of
flight in taking off and landing and while flying over the property of another in taking off or landing, are those at which such
flights by aircraft may be made without being in dangerous
proximity to persons or property on the land or water beneath,
or unsafe to the aircraft."
To be consistent, it would seem that these courts would
have to give full effect to the amended regulation, and hold
all such flights not actionable. But to give such effect to a
traffic regulation seems to be either silly, or unconstitutional,
as a taking of property without compensation, for while regulation of flight is undoubtedly within the broad scope of the
police power, the taking of land for highways has not heretofore been thought to be.
As to flights under 500 feet, both courts ignored that part
of the same sentence of the Regulation which excepted such
flight when landing or taking off.
It is hard to understand why equal force should not have
been given to both parts of the same sentence of the law, but
it was not, and the courts proceeded to consider the lower
flights on common law principles. In the Smith Case, the
court considered these lower flights in two groups.
As to flights between 100 and 500 feet, the court said,
"The one or two instances of flights at less than 500 feet over
land of the plaintiffs and the possibility of similar flights in
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the future, as set out by the master and already narrated, are
not sufficient to require or warrant injunctive relief. The injury thus done to and the interference with any and all valuable use of the property of the plaintiffs are not certain and
substantial, but rather are slight and theoretical. There has
been no physical contact with property of the plaintiffs in
actual use or practicably usable."
This is certainly not a holding that such flights are trespasses.
As to flights under 100 feet, the court said, "In degree
these flights approach much more closely to an interference
with rightful enjoyment of land than do flights at the minimum altitude permissible for general travel by aircraft. * * *

The facts show an intrusion upon the land of the plaintiffs
by flight of aircraft at these low altitudes, by noise, and by the
presence of the aircraft and its occupants. These interferences
create in the ordinary mind a sense of infringement of property rights which can not be minimized or effaced. * * * The

combination of all these factors seems to us, under settled principles of law, * * * to constitute trespass to the land of the

plaintiffs so far as concerns the take-offs and landings at low
altitudes and flights made over the land of the plaintiffs' at
altitudes as low as 100 feet."
But the injunction was denied and the bill dismissed because the plaintiff had not shown any damage to his property
or its use. Nor were even nominal damages allowed. The
court says, "Whether the case should have been retained for
assessment of damages, rested in the sound judicial discretion
of the trial judge. That was exercised against the plaintiffs
and presents no error of law. At most upon this record, there
could have been nothing more than nominal damages".
The decree was entered dismissing the bill with costs to
be taxed in favor of the defendants against the plaintiffs.
Those who contend that the mere flight into space above
the surface is a trespass will gain pleasure from the language
of this opinion, but the plaintiff who rested his suit upon that
claim did not gain so much pleasure. He got no injunction
and no damages and had to pay the costs.
The decision in its actual holding, does not go very far
toward protecting the claim of the landowner, that the close
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be not broken, even at altitudes of less than 100 feet, because
the elements upon which the court relied "to constitute trespass" would, according to general rules, constitute nuisance,
the only new principle being the inclusion of the mere "presence of the aircraft and its occupants" as a significant element
of interference with a use of the land which requires privacy
for its enjoyment.
In the Swetland case all flights under 500 feet were enjoined. The language of the court is as follows: "Whether
-property rights or effective possession is interfered with unreasonably is a question of fact in the particular case. * * * In

this instance, in view of the magnitude of the defendants' contemplated operations, in the opinion of the court, the probability is that if defendants were permitted in taking off and
landing to fly at altitudes lower than 500 feet, such flying,
if it would not constitute a trespass, would at least constitute
the maintenance of a nuisance."

This certainly is not a holding that mere flight above the
surface of the ground, even at a height of less than 500 feet
is a trespass. Rather, the relief was granted to prevent a
violation of the third claim of the landowner, that there be
no reasonable interference with a reasonable use of the land.
The landowner has the exclusive right to occupy the
space and need not show actual damage in order to maintain
an action based on an unauthorized occupation of any part of
the space.
These two cases then, leave the law concerning ownership
of space above and below the surface of the ground, just about
where it was.
The landowner can protect his right to enjoy the use of
his land by action for damages or injunction, if he suffers substantial injury and the injury results from an unreasonable
act by the defendant such as a low and noisy and dangerous
flight through the air space.
But the landowner has not yet been allowed to maintain
an action of any sort against the defendant who merely flys
through the plaintiff's space, coming in contact with no tangible thing, possessing no part of the space, and causing no
substantial injury to the landowner in the enjoyment of his
land. And as yet it has not been necessary to resort by way of
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what seems a valid analogy, to the exception based on necessity, as in the early development of agriculture and grazing
in this state.
Nothing has been said about the Uniform State Law for
Aeronautics because it did not apply to the cases discussed and
because it would seem that such legislation could not constitutionally diminish whatever common law property rights already existed. However, the act has been adopted in more
than twenty states, and its provisions should be noted.
SECTION 3. "The ownership of the space above the lands
and waters of this State is declared to be vested in the several
owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight
described in section 4."
"SECTION 4. "Flight in aircraft over the land and waters
of this State is lawful, unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water,
or the space over the land or water, is put by the owner, or
unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons
or property lawfully on the land or water beneath. The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of another, without
his consent, is unlawful, except in the case of a forced landing.
For damages caused by a forced landing, however, the owner
or lessee of the aircraft or the aeronaut shall be liable".
In effect, this seems to be a statute declaratory of the common law principles of the ownership of space.

